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This paper studies the impact of trade reforms on the evolution of plant's productivity in Chile 
(1979-2000). The main contribution of the paper is to construct detailed measures of trade 
liberalization disentangling the impact of export and import oriented policies. We find 
evidence of a positive impact of export oriented policies on productivity of traded sectors 
relative to non traded. On the other hand, the reduction of import barriers might have a 
positive impact on productivity in export oriented sectors, but it hurts local firms in import 
competing ones probably due to the existence of increasing returns. 
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Trade liberalization was at the core of reform packages implemented in many
developing economies during 1980’s. Several empirical works have found ev-
idence of a positive correlation between trade liberalization and productivity
both at aggregated and plant’s level (see Pavcnik (2002), Bernard and Jensen
(2001), Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2003)). In this
paper we revisit the case of Chile, one of the earliest and most radical exam-
ples of trade liberalization in developing countries. We aim at testing the link
between this reform and productivity in Chilean manufacturing plants. To
test this relationship we ￿rst estimate plant’s TFP taking into account ￿rm
heterogeneity in terms of productivity levels and then estimate the impact
of market access on plant’s productivity. To do so we use the anual industry
ENIA survey (encuesta anual industrial ) of manufacturing Chilean’s plants
and the Trade and Production database provided by CEPII ( centre d’etudes
prospecives et d’information internationalles ).
Our contribution to previous works is to disentangle policy implications
on both export and import sides. We construct a measure of trade liber-
alization which takes into account the evolution of market access over time
and across industries between Chile and its main trading partners. These
measures, usually referred as "border e￿ects", essentially capture trade di￿-
culties from the fact of crossing national border and selling or buying abroad.
Considering only tari￿s or year dummies may neglect two important features
of trade policy. First, unilateral import tari￿ reduction may not be symmetric
among trade partners. Second, the role of non tari￿s barriers, ￿xed export
costs and bilateral agreements may be an important determinant of trade
￿ows. Taking into account the evolution of market access allow us identify-
ing which industries bene￿t the most, in terms of productivity gains, from
import or export oriented policies.
Arguments concerning the consequences of trade liberalization do not
always go in the same direction. Foreign competition is usually highlighted
as a positive engine of productivity. It would press less productive ￿rms to
exit the market and surviving ￿rms to trim their ine￿ciencies. However,
the presence of increasing returns to scale (IRS) and imperfect competition
may introduce new ingredients to the model (Devarajan and Rodrik (1999),
Rodrik (1992)). In particular one of the most important features of the
Krugman (1980) model of economies of scales is precisely that average cost
falls as output increases. In that sense, the size of local market plays an
important role mapping cost structures. The monopoly power means that
3￿rms integrate their demand in their decisions and so the advantage of price
setting1. In a country like Chile, with a population nowadays of 16 million (11
million in the 1982 census), the opportunities for scales economies in import
competing sectors after a radical change in foreign market competition are
likely constrained. On the empirical grounds, Antweler and Tre￿er (2002)
show that indeed scales economies do matter to explain trade patterns.
The literature also suggests learning by exporting as a plausible mech-
anism to explain the e￿ects of trade liberalization on plant’s productivity.
Several empirical works ￿nd evidence of ex post increasing productivity gains
arising from selling in foreign markets (See Aw, Chung, Roberts (1999) for
Korea, Kray (1999) for Chinese ￿rms, and Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for
Chile). The undermining theoretical channel focuses on productivity im-
provements resulting from knowledge and expertise gained in the export pro-
cess. One possible explanation is that exporters learn from their contacts in
the export market, and as a result they adopt better production methods and
achieve higher productivity. Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) construct a
dynamic model based on Baldwin (1989), Dixit (1989) and Krugman (1989).
In their model ￿rm’s current productivity depends on prior export experience.
As a result, learning by exporting widens the gap between the productivity
of ￿rms that enter the export market and those that sell only to the domestic
market. Related to this view Grossman and Helpman (1991) develop a trade
and innovation model emphasizing the role of international spillovers in the
growth process. By disentangling the nature of trade policies, using speci￿c
export and import oriented policies, We might capture bene￿ts stemming
from this mechanism.
Chilean dictatorship in power from 1973 to 1990, implemented a deep
package of market reforms concerning every economic ￿eld. Among them
trade liberalization took place in the second half of seventies. Since the
beginning of the period, all trade barriers and restrictions to trade were
removed. Average nominal tari￿ rates decreased gradually from 98% in 1973
to 10% in 1979. Specially, during nineties one of the main trade strategies of
Chile was to pursuing several trade agreements with di￿erent countries and
regions, without being tied to only one regional customs unions. Chile has
signed trade agreements not only with almost all Latin American countries,
but also with United States, European Union and Asia in recent years.
1IRS in trade models are usually modeled by ￿xed and constant marginal costs, imply-
ing declining average costs. A more precise link to productivity can be made by assessing
that the ￿xed cost might represent an investment in technology that is conditioned by the
anticipation of the demand size and pro￿ts (Rodrik (1988), Bas and Ledezma (2006))
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Graph 5.2 plots the average evolution of the weighted (by market share)
and unweighted average labor productivity between 1979 and 2000. While
the unweighted average labor productivity is directly related to within plant
productivity, the weighted measure takes into account the gains due to the re-
allocation of market shares towards the most productive ￿rms. As the graph
shows, this evidence indicates that after 1987 within plant productivity gains
5become a key mechanism rather than the reallocation process. Consequently
we focus on mechanisms that modify individual productivity after a change
in the exposure to trade rather than to ex-ante self-selection mechanisms
that, holding individual productivity constant, alter the composition of the
average weighted productivity.
Several works have estimated the e￿ects of trade reforms on ￿rm’s produc-
tivity using speci￿c methodologies to estimate production functions, such as
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) (See sec-
tion 4.1.1). These methodologies allow estimating production functions in a
framework of ￿rm heterogeneity. We are particularly interested in two works
that have also studied the Chilean experience. Based on the ENIA Survey,
Pavcnik (2002) estimates the impact of trade on plant’s productivity in Chile
during the period 1979-1986. She applies OP strategy and controls explicitly
for simultaneity and selection issues. Using year dummy variables as proxies
of trade reform (treatement e￿ect in a di￿erence in di￿erence framework),
the conclusion of Pavcnik (2002) is that aggregate productivity improvements
are explained by two factors induced by trade liberalization: (a) the growth
of within plant productivity in importing-competing industries and (b) the
exit of less productive ￿rms and the corresponding reallocation of market
share towards most productive ones. However, as Bergoeing, Hernando and
Repetto (2006) note tari￿s rose between 1983 and 1985 (see graph 5.1 in
Appendix 1). Due to the debt and recession crisis in 1982, the government
increased tari￿s and nominal averages to 26% between 1983 and 1985. More-
over these year dummies are also supposed to be a control of other macro
economic shocks, namely the debt crises and other market reforms. Using
year indicators in interactions with trade orientation sectors implies the im-
plicit assumption that these macro economic shocks a￿ect all sectors in a
uniform way.
Chilean market reforms were recently revisited by Bergoeing, Hernando
and Repetto (2006). They study the impact of trade and ￿nancial liberal-
ization on productivity gains in Chile in a longer period of time (1980-2001)
using the LP strategy. Their results show that aggregate productivity gains
come from within plant improvements over time in traded industries rela-
tive to non traded ones (during the nineties) and from the entry of more
productive ￿rms than the exiting ones. They also ￿nd that the process of
resources reallocation among incumbents play a minor role enhancing aggre-
gate productivity. When explicitly regressing by e￿ective tari￿s productivity
advantages of traded industries are not signi￿cant and import-competing
sectors get (signi￿cantly) productivity gains from protection.
6Unfortunately for identi￿cation issues the drop of Chilean tari￿s was quite
radical but homogeneous across industries. This is probably the reason why
Pavcnik (2002) is constrained to use year dummies and the reason why Ber-
goeing, Hernando and Repetto (2006) can not get enough variance for their
estimates. Estimating the evolution of market access (border e￿ects) between
Chile and its trading partners also allows us to identify heterogeneity across
industries and time. In that sens this paper yields new ￿ndings of trade
policy implications. In order to facilitate the comparison of the results with
previous works we also distinguish between export oriented, import compet-
ing and non traded sectors. We start reproducing Pavcnik’s (2002) results for
the full sample period. Then we run the regressions of productivity using the
measures of border e￿ects in interaction with traded sectors relative to non
traded ones. First, we ￿nd a positive signi￿cant e￿ect of a reduction of ex-
port barriers on productivity in both export oriented and import competing
sectors. Second, we also ￿nd evidence of a positive impact of the reduction of
import di￿culties on productivity in export oriented industries. Finally, the
regressions show that the decrease in import barriers might have a negative
impact on productivity in import competing industries. This latter result
implies that industries in import competing sectors may actually su￿er from
foreign competition probably by reducing their domestic market size and the
possibility to exploit increasing returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the estimation
strategy in three steps is presented. Section 3 discusses the main estimation
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Estimation Strategy
The estimation strategy consists of three steps. In the ￿rst step we estimate
the production function using OLS, Fixed E￿ects and LP methodology to ob-
tain the factor elasticity coe￿cients and to calculate total factor productivity
(TFP) of Chilean manufacturing plants. In the second step, we construct the
measure of trade liberalization estimating the border e￿ects coe￿cients using
a gravity model developed by Fontagne, Mayer and Zignago (2006). Finally,
in the third step we estimate the impact of trade di￿culties regressing pro-
ductivity on border e￿ects coe￿cients in interaction with sectors de￿ned by
trade orientation (export, import competing and non traded industries).
72.1 Step 1: Speci￿cation of production function esti-
mations
As usually plant’s TFP is calculated as the residual between the observed
value added and the estimates of factors contribution. In order to do so
we must estimate the production function at two digit industry level. When
estimating production functions using ￿rm panel data eventual problems con-
cerning simultaneity and selection should be considered. Simultaneity arises
because inputs demand and productivity are positively correlated. Firm
speci￿c productivity is known by the ￿rm but not by the econometrician
and panel data information usually shows that productivity is heterogeneous
among ￿rms and it evolves over time. A high productivity shock implies
greater demand and consequently ￿rms must purchase more inputs. OLS
will tend to provide upwardly biased estimates of labor coe￿cients. If capital
is positively correlated with labor and labor’s correlation with the produc-
tivity shock is higher than capital one, which is the realistic case, then the
coe￿cient of capital may be underestimated.
Selection problems are likely to be present because unobserved produc-
tivity in￿uences the exit decision and we only observe those ￿rms that decide
to stay. On the other hand, if capital is positively correlated with pro￿ts,
￿rms with larger capital stock will anticipate higher pro￿ts and decide to
stay in the market even for low realizations of productivity shocks. So at the
end, there is a potential source of negative correlation in the sample between
productivity shocks and capital stock. This negative correlation means a
downward bias in capital elasticity estimates.
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) propose a methodology of three stages to
control for unobserved productivity incorporating exit and investment rules
derived from ￿rm optimal behaviour. In the ￿rst stage they use the invest-
ment rule, a function of capital stock and unobserved productivity, to address
simultaneity. OP invert this investment rule to express unobserved produc-
tivity as a function of investment and capital. This inverted function is used
as a proxy for productivity in the estimation. In the second stage, based on
the exit rule they estimate the probability of survival conditional on avail-
able information to the ￿rm. Following an optimal behaviour their exit rule
states that ￿rms decide to exit the market if productivity realization shocks
are lower than a speci￿c productivity cut-o￿ which in turn is determined by
capital stock and productivity. The estimates of this survival probability are
used to control for selection bias. To obtain the capital coe￿cient, we sub-
stitue the estimates of labor coe￿cient (stage 1), the productivity function
8(inverted investment decision) and the survival probability (stage 2) into the
production function equation.
Besides some technical di￿erences (such us the use of GMM criterion and
bootstraps), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) make use of this strategy
and extend it showing that inputs (like electricity or materials) can be better
proxies to control for unobserved productivity when one deals with simul-
taneity. Inputs adjust in a more ￿exible way, so they are more likely to have
better responsive to productivity shocks. Moreover, inputs usually have more
non-zero observations than investment, a property that has consequences on
estimation e￿ciency. In the case of the ENIA this property is important. As
LP show the risk of selection biases are signi￿cantly reduced by considering
a non balanced panel.
There are some advantages of OP-LP strategy over alternative methods.
Firstly, it performs better than ￿xed e￿ects because it does not assume that
the unobserved individual e￿ect (productivity) is constant over time when
controlling for simultaneity. Secondly, approaches based on instrumental
variables can be limited by the instruments availability. Finally, it does not
assume restrictions on the parameters. For instance, an alternative approach
is the one developed by Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2005). They show how
misleading can be the use of sale revenues to measure output in productivity
accounting. Factor prices and mark-ups can produce important distortions
if they are not homogeneous. However, the methodology proposed in their
paper assumes constant returns to scales and neglect entry-exit process to
facilitate likelihood estimates. Again both assumptions are not neutral in
the case of the ENIA.
In order to maximize sample size with a reduced risk of selection we keep
the LP strategy and use electricity as a proxy for unobserved productivity. In
the ￿rst step, we will estimate the following speci￿cation of a Cobb Douglas
production function:
(1) yit = ￿0 + ￿1xit + ￿2kit + "it
Where all variables are expressed in natural logarithmics, " yit" is the
value added of plant "i", "x" are variable inputs (skilled and unskilled labor)
and "k" is the stock of capital. Consequently, TFP in log ( ait) is computed
as the residual of this function, given by:
b ait = yit ￿ b ￿1xit ￿ b ￿2kit
92.2 Step 2: Speci￿cation of Border E￿ects estimation
It is well known that the reduction of tari￿s in Chile was homogeneous across
industries. As a consequence we do not have variance in tari￿s measures
among industries. Even their rise in early eighties, during the deep Chilean
debt crisis, was homogeneous. On the other hand, tari￿s are not the only
measure that matter in trade. One should consider bilateral agreements,
asymmetries between export and import costs and industrial speci￿c di￿-
culties to trade, not only concerning direclty policies but also home biases,
tastes and the like. Actually, by considering all these issues we obtain het-
erogeneity in both industrial and time dimensions.
Using a gravity equation framework, we measure the di￿culties of bilat-
eral trade explained by the fact of crossing the border between two countries.
We apply to Chile and Chilean’s trade partners the methodology developed
by Fontagne, Mayer and Zignago (2005) 2. The gravity bilateral trade equa-
tion that we estimate is based on a comparison between international ( mijs)
















mijs: imports of industry "s" in country "i" from country "j"
miis: volume of trade within a country measured as the overall production
minus total exports in industry "s" in country "i".
aij: consumer preferences of country "i" with respect to varieties pro-
duced in j.
vjs: the value of production in industry "s" in country "j"
pj: Index price in country "j"
Trade costs (￿ij) are composed by distance (d￿
ij) (related to transport
costs), advalorem tari￿s (tij) and "tari￿ equivalent" of non tari￿ barriers
(NTB ij)
￿ijpj ￿ d￿
ij (1 + tij)(1 + NTBij)pj.
The structure of protection varies across all partner pairs and depends
on the direction of the ￿ow for a given pair. To capture this protection
2Omitted here, they develop further steps to disentangle the origin of the border e￿ect.
We are interested in the residual measure involving all policy di￿culties, tari￿ and non
tari￿ barriers, agreements, political e￿orts and the like.
10framework, taking the example of the US as trade partner, the following
dummy structure is de￿ned:
(1 + tij)(1 + NTBij) ￿ exp[￿USA ￿ CHLij + aCHL ￿ USAij]
USA-CHLij: is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when j (6= i) is Chile and
i the USA (related to imports of USA from Chile).
CHL-USAij: is a dummy variable set equal to 1 when j (6=i) is the US
and i Chile (imports of Chile from USA).
Preferences aij are composed by a random component eij and the coe￿-
cient ￿ which represents a systematic preference for goods produced in the
home country. This "home market bias" is reduced to ( ￿i ￿ ￿) when the
countries share the same language (Lij = 1):
aij ￿ exp[eij ￿ (￿i ￿ ￿Lij)(USA ￿ CHLij + CHL ￿ USAij)]





















￿(￿ ￿ 1)[￿i + ￿]USA CHLij ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)[￿i + a]CHL USAij + Zij + ￿ij
This equation can be estimated at country level (considering all indus-
tries) and also at industry level. From the latter estimation we obtain the
global border e￿ect measure for each industry as a weighted average of all
trading partners. The border e￿ect coe￿cient of each import (export) ￿ow
will be weighted by the share of the ￿ow on total imports (exports). Since we
drop the constant and incorporate dummy variables for each combination,
the coe￿cients of the dummy variables can be interpreted as the border ef-
fect of each combination. For example, the exponential of the coe￿cient of
USA ￿CHLij multiplied by -1, exp((￿ ￿ 1)[￿i + ￿]) indicates the di￿culty
for Chilean’s exporters in accessing to the US markets. The part of missing
trade mainly caused by trade policy is captured in these coe￿cients.
In the estimation we consider not only the US but also other countries
trading with Chile. To determine the main trading partners of Chile we
use the aggregated trade ￿ows data of ECLAC. Between 1990 and 1999 the
main destination countries of Chile manufacturing exports are Latin America
11(AL), the United States (USA) and the European Union (UE). At the same
time, most manufacturing imports from Chile come from these countries. In
the Border E￿ects regressions we consider nine countries of European Union
, which were members through out the whole period (1979-1999). 3
Finally, there is a potential source of endogeneity since in step three
we will use these border e￿ect coe￿cients to estimate the impact of trade
liberalization on plant’s TFP in di￿erent sectors. Most productive sectors
or those producing high quality goods will tend to increase their trade ￿ows
and to have a smaller border e￿ect. To address this issue we use relative
wages and productivity as control variables (Zij) in the estimation of border
e￿ects. In that sense the residual measure of missing trade that is captured
by the border e￿ect will be free of productivity concerns.
3Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherlands
and Denmark
122.3 Step 3: Speci￿cation of the estimation of the im-
pact of trade liberalization on TFP
In this ￿nal step we use the (weighted average) border e￿ect estimated for
each industry to measure the impact of trade liberalization on productivity
across export and import competing sectors relative to non traded indus-
tries. We estimate the following reduced equation similar to the di￿erence in
di￿erence framework implemented by Pavcnik (2002):
(3) b ait = ￿0 + ￿(BE) + ￿(Sector) + ￿(BE ￿ Sector) + ￿Zit + ￿it
ait: log of plant’s TFP estimated by LP strategy or by Fixed E￿ects.
BE: vector of import border e￿ect (BE M) and export border e￿ect
estimates (BE X) at two digit industry level
Sector: vector of trade orientation dummies 4: export oriented (Export)
and import competing (Import) industries.
Zij: vector of plant characteristics: industry a￿liation (ISIC 3 Ind),
competition (ind comp) and indicators of entry and exit (Entry indicator;
Exit indicator))
The excluded categories are non traded sector, the year 1979 and the
sector 385 5. We are principally interested in the estimates of the vector
coe￿cient ￿. It is usually expected a negative and signi￿cant coe￿cient
meaning that a reduction of trade barriers has a higher positive e￿ect on
productivity in traded industries (export oriented and import competing)
than in non traded ones. The vector coe￿cient ￿ informs about the relative
productivity advantage of traded industries in Chilean manufacture.
4We classi￿ed sectors by trade orientation using 4 digit industry classi￿cation. Plants
belonging to 4 digit industry which have more than 15% of exports over total production
are classi￿ed as exported oriented plants; while plants belonging to 4 digit industry which
have more than 15% of import penetration indicator are classi￿ed as import competing
plants. The rest are considered as non traded plants. See Pavcnik (2002) for further details
concerning this classi￿cation.
5Manufacture of professional and scienti￿c, measuring and controlling equipment not
elsewhere classi￿ed, and of photographic and optical goods
132.4 Data
In the ￿rst step we use manufacturing plant level data from the ENIA Sur-
vey provided by the Chilean institute of statistics INE (Instituto Nacional de
Estadisticas). This survey is a manufacturing census of Chilean plants with
more than 10 employees. Our data covers the period 1979-2000 and contains
information concerning mainly added value, materials, labor, investment and
exports (only available from 1990). The ENIA survey has been used in pre-
vious studies such as Pavcnik (2002), Liu and Tybout (1996), Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) and Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2006) for di￿erent sam-
ple periods. We used several speci￿c de￿ators (at three digit Isic-Rev2 and
year base 1992) for added value, exports, materials and investment. Capital
series were constructed using the methodology developed by Bergoeing, Her-
nando and Repetto (2006). Table 5.2 (Appendix 1) shows general descriptive
statistics of the sample.
In the second step we use data from "Trade and Production Database"
constructed by CEPII using mainly data of the World Bank. In this compi-
lation, production variables are completed with the UNIDO and the OECD
STAN databases, and trade variables with the international trade database
(BACI) available from CEPII. This database is provided at the ISIC rev2
3-digit industry level over the period 1976-1999 for 67 developing and devel-
oped countries. For distance variables, contiguity and common language, we
also used the CEPII database of internal and external distances. Distances
variables between two countries are measured based on bilateral distance
between cities weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s pop-
ulation. Finally, price indexes steam from Penn World Table as price level
of GDP expressed relative to United States. Following Fontagne, Mayer and
Zignago (2005), we use aggregate price indexes instead of industrial wages
or (the unavailable) prices at industry level to reduce potential endogeneity
problems.6
6There is an endogeneity issue that arise using price indexes in the estimation of border
e￿ects. Trade ￿ows are determined by relative prices which are also a function of border
barriers and consequently, they also depend on trade ￿ows. Fontagne, Mayer and Zignago
(2006) estimate border e￿ects at industry level and they address this issue using aggregate
price indexes, which are less likely to be correlated to industry level changes in expected
pro￿ts than industry prices
143 Results
3.1 Results step 1: T.F.P. estimations
In this step we estimate the equation (1) a Cobb Douglas production function
at 2 ISIC industry level using OLS, Fixed E￿ects and LP strategy. Table 3.1.
shows the results. As expected, LP estimates of unskilled labor elasticities
are generally the lowest and those of capital elasticities the highest, meaning
that the biases induced by the higher responsiveness of the labor input re-
spect to capital are addressed. Considering LP estimates, in ￿ve industries 7,
among them the main exporters, we can not reject at 5% the null hypothesis
of constant returns to scale in the Wald test. On the other hand, indus-
tries presenting increasing returns to scale are mainly importers. For these
industries the size of the market may a￿ect positively their productivity.
After estimating production function coe￿cients we calculate TFP as
a residual measure. In Graph 3.1 the evolution of di￿erent measures of
plant’s productivity is presented: ￿xed e￿ects (TFP fe), LP (TFP lp), OLS
(TFP ols) and the sample mean of valued added over labor (lnproductivity)
.
7Food (31), wood (33), non metallic minerals (36) and basic metals (37) and other (39)
15Industry Factors
Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Food and  U 0,815 0,010 0,627 0,012 0,570 0,024
Beverage S 0,359 0,009 0,159 0,008 0,212 0,015
K 0,250 0,005 0,083 0,007 0,208 0,046
N 18559
Textil U 0,833 0,011 0,777 0,014 0,710 0,024
S 0,202 0,010 0,165 0,009 0,174 0,018
K 0,206 0,005 0,102 0,008 0,249 0,034
N 11063
Wood U 0,865 0,017 0,849 0,021 0,681 0,034
S 0,208 0,015 0,095 0,014 0,131 0,021
K 0,209 0,009 0,104 0,013 0,275 0,040
N 5711
Paper U 0,763 0,018 0,539 0,024 0,692 0,044
S 0,252 0,014 0,175 0,015 0,207 0,025
K 0,229 0,010 0,182 0,014 0,299 0,055
N 3175
Chemicals U 0,604 0,016 0,639 0,017 0,528 0,045
S 0,337 0,015 0,168 0,013 0,266 0,028
K 0,294 0,008 0,149 0,011 0,354 0,057
N 6588
Non metalic  U 0,780 0,028 0,797 0,031 0,577 0,074
products S 0,241 0,026 0,130 0,025 0,103 0,049
K 0,244 0,013 0,136 0,018 0,281 0,074
N 2153
Basic Metals U 0,280 0,070 0,346 0,061 0,217 0,104
S 0,485 0,063 0,161 0,045 0,263 0,094
K 0,412 0,042 0,059 0,049 0,290 0,189
N 640
Machinery U 0,897 0,012 0,766 0,015 0,767 0,033
S 0,242 0,011 0,204 0,011 0,178 0,022
K 0,164 0,006 0,111 0,010 0,236 0,058
N 8524
Other U 0,880 0,054 0,669 0,063 0,671 0,114
S 0,214 0,042 0,214 0,046 0,160 0,081
K 0,093 0,022 0,180 0,032 0,277 0,082
N 647
Note: U: unskilled labor, S: skilled labor, K: Capital and N: Observations
Table 3.1.: Estimates of Production Function
[1] [2] [3]
OLS FIXED EFFECTS L.P. Semiparametric
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As a ￿rst robustness check of our performance measures, the graph shows
that labor productivity and all TFP measures depict similar evolutions. Al-
though the elasticities estimated by ￿xed e￿ects and LP show some di￿er-
ences, the TFP path illustrated by both measures is very similar. Even if
￿xed e￿ects TFP may overestimate capital coe￿cient and underestimate la-
bor coe￿cient, after computing all factors contribution the evolution of the
residual is not drastically a￿ected.
Graph 3.1.2. shows the evolution of TFP (LP) by sector classi￿ed by
trade orientation. Plants in export oriented sectors are in average more
productive than those in import competing sectors. The productivity of non
traded plants slows down during the eighties and it slightly recovers during
the nineties but it is always behind the TFP of traded sectors.
17Graph 3.1.2.:
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3.2 Results step 2: Estimations of Border E￿ects
In the second step we construct our measure of market access by estimating
equation 2 to obtain border e￿ects for ￿ve periods at two digit industry level.
Graphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 show the evolution of the weighted average of bor-
der e￿ects between Chile and the United States, Latin American countries
and the European Union (weighted by the share of trade ￿ows of each trade
partner). All coe￿cients of border e￿ects are signi￿cant at least at 10% .
Graph 3.2.1 shows the evolution of export border e￿ects measuring the dif-
￿culties for Chilean’s exporters to access foreign market. Export barriers
were almost constant during the ￿rst half of eighties and even in some indus-
tries like woods they increased during this period. Re￿ecting asymmetries
between import and export policies, export di￿culties have considerably di-
minished in all industries during nineties (except for food industry) even if
tari￿s were already very low.
Graph 3.2.2 shows the evolution of the weighted average of import border
e￿ect measuring barriers faced by UE, LA and USA to access Chilean mar-
kets. In this case, in many industries the market access di￿culties increased
during the ￿rst half of eighties, which seems very consistent with the raise
in import tari￿s during this period. From 1987 to the end of nineties import
18border e￿ects have been drastically reduced in almost all industries with the
exception of basic metals, a traditional exporter industry.
Graph 3.2.1:
Estimation of Market access of Chilean's exporters   
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Graph 3.2.2:
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193.3 Results step 3: The impact of Trade Liberalization
on TFP
The ￿nal step consists in identifying the in￿uence of speci￿c trade reforms on
the evolution of plant’s productivity. Equation (3) disentangles the variation
in productivity due to changes in trade policy depending on trade orienta-
tion. We are interested in the coe￿cient vector ￿, concerning the interactions
between the indicator of a plant’s trade orientation and the measure of trade
policy. These coe￿cients show the productivity di￿erential for plants be-
longing to traded sectors relative to those belonging to non traded sectors,
which is explained by the e￿ect of trade policy.
In order to give baseline estimation, we ￿rst run the regressions in ￿xed
e￿ects using year dummy indicators as a measure of trade liberalization and
we obtain similar results to Pavcnik (2002). Once controlling for exit and
plant’s speci￿c characteristics, trade liberalization (if captured by year dum-
mies) has a positive impact on productivity of traded sectors (export oriented
and import competing) relative to non traded ones (see Appendix 2).
Now we use the weighted measures of border e￿ects for each industry
estimated in step 2 to analyse the impact of the outcome of export and
import trade policies on plant’s TFP. We check robustness of our results
using as dependant variable TFP measured by ￿xed e￿ects (Table 2) and LP
(table 3) estimations. Once we use year and industry indicators to control for
industry speci￿c e￿ects and macro economic shocks, the coe￿cients of the
rest of variables will only capture the e￿ects of within industry productivity
variation. We also use Huber-White estimator of variance to correct standard
errors.
In the ￿rst column (table 2 and table 3) we run the regression without
controling for exit, entry indicators and domestic competition. Giving our
framework we interpret the coe￿cients of interactions relative to non traded
sector, the omitted category. The export border e￿ect in the two interac-
tions terms (with the export oriented and the import competing dummies)
presents a negative and signi￿cant coe￿cient. This suggests a positive im-
pact of a reduction of export barriers on plant’s productivity in both export
oriented and import competing sectors. The regression aims at capturing
within plant productivity improvements as a consequence of trade policies
rather than aggregate productivity improvements coming from reallocation
and ￿rm renewal. In that sense what we observe may be related to external-
ities captured after exporting such as learning by exporting and knowledge
spillovers coming from international markets (Aw, Chung, Roberts, 1999).
20Regarding the called "import competing sectors", this positive e￿ect of the
reduction of export barriers can be driven by exporters inside these sectors.
It is well documented in ￿rm heterogeneity literature that even in narrow de-
￿ned industries exporters and importers compete with some degree of di￿er-
entiation. The reduction of export costs will allow new ￿rms start exporting.
Bergoeing, Micco and Repetto (2005) show that there were many plants that
started exporting during the nineties in Chilean industries having a small
aggregate export share.
Concerning the impact of import barriers, the results depend on the sec-
tor. We ￿nd evidence of a negative e￿ect of a reduction of import barriers on
productivity of plants belonging to import competing sectors (the interaction
between import border e￿ect and import competing sector). Therefore, in-
creasing foreign competition will dampen the productivity of plants in these
sectors. As suggested by Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2006) this fact
may be related to increasing returns. We observed in the estimates of produc-
tion functions that import competing industries present in general increasing
returns to scale. Foreign competition reduces the market shares of domestic
￿rms shrinking the opportunities to exploit economies of scales.
On the other hand, the reduction of the di￿culties of foreign exporters to
access the Chilean market (the reduction of import barriers) has a positive
impact on productivity in export oriented sectors (the interaction between
import border e￿ect and export oriented sector). A better access to new tech-
nologies and to high quality inputs may explain this within plant productivity
improvement. In the case of import competing sectors, the negative e￿ect of
market size may be negative enough to counteract this positive outcome.
Once we control for exit (column 2), entry (column 3) and domestic com-
petition using a Her￿ndahl indicator of market concentration (column 4) the
results remain almost unchanged. As expected, the exit indicator has a neg-
ative coe￿cient meaning that exiting ￿rms are less productive than those
that decide to stay in the market. Exiting plants are on average 17% less
productive than surviving plants. The coe￿cient of the entry indicator is
also negative indicating that new ￿rms are roughly 5% less productive than
incumbents. The coe￿cient of domestic competition is negative (though less
signi￿cant), implying that a reduction of market concentration will enhance
productivity. Finally note that the coe￿cients of both border e￿ects (with-
out interaction) are positive and signi￿cant, meaning that the improvement
of market access in both sides may have negative e￿ects on productivity in
non traded sectors (put zeros in import competing and export oriented dum-
mies). This may be explained by general equilibrium e￿ects that should be
21studied in more detail 8. By the moment we will concentrate on relative
e￿ects.
We also check robustness of these results using a moving average of border
e￿ects to take into account the possible "‘lagged"’ impact of trade reform on
plant’s productivity. It might be the case that plants do not react instanta-
neously to changes in trade policies. To control for this issue, we construct
a moving average of four years of each border e￿ect at industry level. For
example, the border e￿ect of the year 1982 is an average of border e￿ects
from 1979 to 1982. Therefore, in the regression of TFP on border e￿ects
we lose the three ￿rst years (1979,1980 and 1981). The last column reports
the results of this estimation. In the case of the TFP measured by ￿xed
e￿ects (table 2) the coe￿cients of all interactions between border e￿ects and
sector trade orientation remain signi￿cant and with the same sign but they
have a lower value. Nevertheless, when we used the TFP estimated by LP
strategy (table3), the coe￿cients of the interaction between import barriers
and import competing sector is non signi￿cant. In this last speci￿cation, all
other coe￿cients remain signi￿cant and with the same sign.
To sump up, we ￿nd robust evidence that traded sectors increase their
productivity, relative to non traded sectors, as a consequence of export ori-
ented policies. In the case of import oriented policies the e￿ects on pro-
ductivity depends on sectors. While export oriented sectors improve their
productivity, probably thanks to the increase in the foreign demand and the
easier access to imported inputs and technology, domestic plants competing
with imports may su￿er from this foreign competition.
8One possible mechanism may be the increase in the cost of the (mobile) labor factor as
a consequence of the increasing foreign demand. This may induce imperfect substitution
in consumption towards foreign exporter. This will reduce the size of local ￿rms and avoid
the exploitation of economies of scales.
22Table 1: The impact of TL on productivity: TFP FE
Model [FE (1)] [FE (2)] [FE (3)] [FE (4)] [FE (5)]
Export 1.295*** 1.310*** 1.307*** 1.160*** 0.878**
(0.351) (0.347) (0.345) (0.348) (0.435)
Import 0.827*** 0.842*** 0.833*** 0.722** -2.154***
(0.319) (0.314) (0.312) (0.314) (0.462)
Export*BE X -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.012*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Import*BE X -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.046***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Export*BE M -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.058***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Import*BE M 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.022**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
BE X 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.076***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
BE M 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Exit ind NO -0.165*** -0.170*** -0.169*** -0.149***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Entry ind NO NO -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.067***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
ind comp NO NO NO -0.247*** -0.187*
(0.090) (0.100)
ISIC 3 Ind YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR Ind YES YES YES YES YES
Obs 56372 56372 56372 56372 46894
R-sq 0.213 0.221 0.222 0.223 0.253
Note: Huber White Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:10, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
23Table 2: The impact of TL on productivity: TFP LP
Model [FE (1)] [FE (2)] [FE (3)] [FE (4)] [FE (5)]
Export 2.168*** 2.182*** 2.179*** 2.056*** -0.012
(0.366) (0.363) (0.361) (0.366) (0.415)
Import 1.524*** 1.538*** 1.530*** 1.437*** -1.789***
(0.337) (0.334) (0.331) (0.334) (0.441)
Export*BE X -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.016**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Import*BE X -0.103*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.046***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Export*BE M -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.067***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Import*BE M 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
BE X 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
BE M 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.045***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Exit ind NO -0.156*** -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.139***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Entry ind NO NO -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.064***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
ind comp NO NO NO -0.239** -0.097
(0.094) (0.103)
ISIC 3 Ind YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR Ind YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs 56372 56372 56372 56372 46894
R-sq 0.243 0.243 0.250 0.250 0.253
Note: Huber White Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:10, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
24As we mentioned, there is a potential endogeneity problem if we want to
measure the impact of border e￿ects on plant’s productivity because border
e￿ects may depend on productivity. We already addressed this issue in the
previous section when we estimated the border e￿ects controlling by relative
wages and productivity measures. Therefore, we expect that our estimates of
border e￿ects are free of the impact of industry productivity. Furthermore,
we use border e￿ects estimates at 2 digit industry level, while the dummy of
industry trade orientation is de￿ned at 3 digits. As an additional check we
run quantile regressions (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). The idea is to estimate
models for conditional quantile functions, that is, quantiles of the conditional
distribution of TFP expressed as functions of the observed covariates. This
allows asking whether the conditional ￿t of the mean is also representative
for the median or other conditional quantiles. In that sense, if the weight
of the border e￿ect in the regression is driven by the most productive ￿rms,
this disparity should be re￿ected at di￿erent quantiles. Table 4 compares
the coe￿cients in the estimation at the 25, 50 and 75 quantiles with the
￿xed e￿ect estimation (around the mean) and shows that the magnitude,
the signi￿cance and the sign of coe￿cients among the di￿erent ￿ts do not
change our conclusions.
Table 3: Quantile Regression
Model [q25] [q50] [q75] [Mean]
Export*BE X -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Import*BE X -0.089*** -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.103***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Export*BE M -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.030*** -0.033***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Import*BE M 0.046*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.063***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)






Note: Huber White Standard errors in parentheses
￿p < 0:10, ￿￿p < 0:05, ￿￿￿p < 0:01
25Another strategy would be to instrument the border e￿ect with policy
variables such as tari￿s in order to keep only the (exogenous) information
of trade policies. However, at the industry level we do not have too much
variance for imports and for exports the data is only available from 1996
in the CEPII compilation. Moreover, as exposed above, the fact that trade
policies have gone far beyond tari￿s reduction arise the question about the
potential missing information in this instrument.
4 Conclusions
This study addresses the e￿ect of import and export oriented policies on
the evolution of plant’s productivity using Chilean data of manufacturing
plants. To measure plant’s TFP we estimate the production function of each
two digit industry using a semiparametric methodology that takes into ac-
count the heterogeneity of productivity among ￿rms. The main contribution
of the paper is to construct an accurate measure of the outcome of trade
liberalization at the industry level to disentangle the impact of the reduction
of export and import barriers on plant productivity.
The incorporation of a more detailed measure of trade liberalization in-
troduces two new results. First, the reduction of export barriers improves
productivity of plants belonging to both export oriented and import com-
peting sectors, relative to non traded sectors. As the export costs fall, more
￿rms are able to export increasing their size and probably bene￿ting from
knowledge spillovers arising from the foreign market.
Second, the reduction of import barriers shows a positive impact on the
evolution of plant’s productivity of export oriented sectors relative to non
traded. However, this is not the case for plants competing with foreign
exporters. It seems that the reduction of import barriers might hurt the
bene￿ts from increasing returns since it reduces the domestic share of local
￿rms. This has consequence on policy implications. Trade policy should by
rather focused on export oriented measures such as reinforcement of bilat-
eral or multilateral trade agreements and reducing the ￿xed export costs of
adapting the product to the new market.
To our point of view, further research should be oriented in two directions.
Firstly, the possible endogeneity issue mentioned in the previous paragraphs
26should be completely tackled by means of good instruments for border e￿ects
such as policy indicators at the industry level for exporter and importers over
the full sample period. Secondly, theoretical and empirical e￿orts should be
focused on general equilibrium e￿ects by which the consequences of speci￿c
oriented policies are transmitted to the rest of the economy.
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